Team Semantics generalizes Tarski's Semantics for First Order Logic by allowing formulas to be satisfied or not satisfied by sets of assignments rather than by single assignments. Because of this, in Team Semantics it is possible to extend the language of First Order Logic via new types of atomic formulas that express dependencies between different assignments.
Introduction
Team Semantics [20, 30] generalizes Tarski's Semantics for First Order Logic by letting formulas be satisfied or not satisfied by sets of assignments (called teams) rather than just by single assignments. This semantics was originally developed by Hodges in [20] in order to provide a compositional semantics for Independence-Friendly Logic [18, 27] , an extension of First Order Logic that generalizes its game-theoretic semantics by allowing agents to have imperfect information regarding the current game position; 1 but, as observed by Väänänen [30] , Team Semantics is a logical framework that is deserving of study in its own right. Team Semantics is a natural generalization of Tarskian Semantics for First Order Logic 2 with deep connections to its game-theoretical semantics (very briefly, sets of assignments in Team Semantics correspond precisely to sets of possible plays in the corresponding semantic game). In the case of First Order Logic itself, this semantics is equivalent and reducible to the usual Tarskian semantics, but the higher order nature of its satisfaction relation makes it possible to extend it in new ways. This is of considerable theoretical interest: indeed, Team Semantics may then be seen as a tool to describe and classify novel fragments of Second Order Logic, an issue of great importance -and deep connections, via Descriptive Complexity Theory, to the theory of computation -regarding which much is still not known; and it is also of more practical interest, particularly because of the connections between Team 1 In [2], a combinatorial argument was used to show that a compositional semantics cannot exist for Independence Friendly Logic if we require satisfaction (with respect to a model M) to be a relation between single assignments and formulas. In [7] , this result was extended to the case of infinite models. 2 "Teamified" versions of other semantics, however, exist and have been studied as well. See in particular Modal Team Semantics [17, 29, 31, 33] and Propositional Team Semantics [34, 35] .
Semantics and Database Theory (see for instance [16, 24] ). It is worth mentioning here also that probabilistic variants of Team Semantics have recently gathered some interest (see for instance [3, 4, 15] ). Much of the initial wave of research in this area focused on specific Team Semantics-based extensions of First Order Logic, in particular Dependence Logic [30] and later Independence Logic [14] and Inclusion Logic [8, 13] ; but there are still relatively few general results regarding the effects of extending First Order Logic via Team Semantics. 3 The simplest way of doing so, for instance, is by introducing generalized dependency atoms Dx that express dependencies between different assignments in the current set of assignments; and it is a consequence of the higher order nature of Team Semantics that, even if D itself is first order definable as a property of relations, the logic FO(D) obtained by adding it to First Order Logic (with Team Semantics) may well be much more expressive than First Order Logic.
A natural question would then be: can we find necessary and sufficient conditions for that not to happen? Or, in other words, for which dependency atoms D or families of dependency atoms D do we have that every sentence of FO(D) (resp. FO(D)) is equivalent to some first order sentence? An answer to this would be of clear theoretical interest, as part of the before-mentioned programme of using Team Semantics to describe and classify fragments of Second Order Logic; and it would also be of more practical interest, as it would allow us to find out which families of dependencies are expressively "safe".
This question, however, has not been answered yet. In [9] , a fairly general family of dependencies was found that does not increase the expressive power of First Order Logic if added to it; but it is an open question whether any dependency that is "safe" for First Order Logic (the term used for this is "Strongly First Order") is also definable in terms of dependencies in that family.
Building on recent work in [11] on the classification of downwards closed dependencies, this work provides a partial answer to this under two additional assumptions, namely that such a dependency is relativizable (Definition 15) and non-jumping (Definition 17). These are natural properties that are true of essentially all the dependency atoms studied so far, and of most types of dependencies that are of interest; and thus, for those dependencies, the results of this work completely answer the above question. Additionally, a simple result concerning Boolean Disjunction in Team Semantics will be proved along the way -as a necessary tool for the main result -that may be seen as a preliminary step towards the study of such questions in the more general case of operators (rather than mere atoms) in Team Semantics.
Preliminaries
In Team Semantics, formulas are satisfied or not satisfied by sets of assignments (called teams) rather than by single assignments as in Tarskian semantics.
The following definitions provide the basic framework of this semantics: Given a sentence φ and a model M whose signature contains that of φ, we say that φ is true in Team Semantics if and only if M |= {ǫ} φ, where {ǫ} is the team containing the only assignment ǫ over the empty set of variables.
As mentioned in the Introduction, with respect to First Order Logic proper Team Semantics is equivalent and reducible to Tarskian Semantics. More precisely, it can be shown by structural induction that 4 We need at least two elements in our model in order to encode disjunctions in terms of existential quantifications in Proposition 20 and Theorem 29. The case in which only one element exists is in any case trivial, and may be dealt with separately if required. 5 As is common in the study of Team Semantics, we will generally assume that all expressions are in Negation Normal Form. 6 We do not require Y1 and Y2 to be disjoint. ◮ Proposition 6. For all first order formulas φ, models M and teams X, M |= X φ if and only if, for all assignments s ∈ X, M |= s φ according to Tarskian Semantics.
In particular, if φ is a sentence then φ is true in M in the sense of Team Semantics if and only if it is true in M in the sense of Tarskian Semantics.
What is then the point of Team Semantics? In brief, Team Semantics allows us to extend First Order Logic in new ways, like for instance by adding new types of atoms describing dependencies between different assignments.
for the language obtained by adding atoms of the form D i y i to First Order Logic, where the y i range over all tuples of variables of the same arity as D i , with the satisfaction rules
A case of particular interest is the one in which the class of models describing the semantics of a generalized dependency is itself first order definable: A peculiar aspect of Team Semantics is that, due to the second order existential quantification implicit in its rules for disjunction and existential quantification, first order generalized dependencies can still increase considerably the expressive power of First Order Logic when added to it. For example, the Team Semantics-based logics that have been most studied so far are Dependence Logic [30] , Independence Logic [14] and Inclusion Logic [8] , that add to First Order Logic respectively Functional Dependence Atoms: For all tuples of variables x and y, M |= X =(x, y) iff any two s, s ′ ∈ X that agree on the value of x also agree on the value y; Independence Atoms: For all tuples of variables x, y and z, M |= X x⊥ y z iff for any two s, s ′ ∈ X that agree on y there is some s ′′ ∈ X that agrees with s on x and y and with s ′ on y and z; 7 Inclusion Atoms: For all tuples of variables x and y of the same length, M |= X x ⊆ y iff for all s ∈ X there exists some s ′ ∈ X with s(x) = s ′ (y).
It is easy to see that these three types of dependency atoms are all first order in the sense of Definition 8. However, (Functional) Dependence Logic FO(=(·, ·)) is as expressive as full Existential Second Order Logic, and so is Independence Logic FO(⊥), whereas Inclusion Logic is equivalent to the positive fragment of Greatest Fixed Point Logic [13] (and hence, by [21, 32] , captures PTIME over finite ordered models).
Does this imply that (Functional) Dependence Logic and Independence Logic are equivalent to each other and strictly contain Inclusion Logic? This is not as unambiguous a question as it may seem. It certainly is the case that every Inclusion Logic sentence is equivalent to some Independence Logic sentence, that every Dependence Logic sentence is equivalent to some Independence Logic sentence, and and that every Independence Logic sentence is equivalent to some Dependence Logic sentence; but on the other hand, it is not the case that every Inclusion Logic formula, or every Independence Logic one, is equivalent to some Dependence Logic formula. This follows at once from the following classification:
◮ Definition 9 (Empty Team Property, Closure Properties). Let D be a generalized dependency. Then D has the Empty Team Property iff 
From these facts -that are proven easily by structural induction -it follows at once that functional dependence atoms (which are downwards closed, but not union closed) cannot be used to define inclusion atoms (which are union closed, but not downwards closed) or independence atoms (which are neither downwards closed nor union closed). Additionally, since all these three types of dependencies have the Empty Team Property we have at once that none of them, even together, can be used to define for instance the nonemptiness atom
Differently from functional dependence atoms, inclusion atoms and independence atoms, some types of generalized dependencies do not increase the expressive power of First Order Logic when added to it: this is the case, for example, of the NE dependency just introduced. More in general, it was shown in [9] that if D ↑ is the set of all upwards closed first order dependencies and =(·) is the constancy atom such that M |= X =(v) iff |X(v)| ≤ 1, 9 then every sentence of FO(D ↑ , =(·)) is equivalent to some first order sentence. In other words, we have that D ↑ ∪ {=(·)} is strongly first order according to the following definition:
are strongly first order, as they can be defined in terms of upwards closed first order dependencies and constancy atoms; and as mentioned in [10] , the same type of argument can be used to show that all first order dependencies D(R) where R has arity one are also strongly first order.
No strongly first order dependency has been found yet that is not definable in FO(D ↑ , = (·)). This led to the following ◮ Conjecture 1. Every strongly first order dependency D(R) is definable in terms of upwards closed dependencies and constancy atoms.
We also recall here the following slight generalization of the notion of strongly first order dependency:
◮ Definition 12 (Safe Dependencies). Let D and E be two families of dependencies. Then we say that D is safe for E iff any sentence of FO(D, E) is equivalent to some sentence of FO(E).
Clearly, a dependency is strongly first order if and only if it is safe for the empty set of dependencies. However, as shown in [12] , a strongly first order dependency is not necessarily safe for all families of dependencies: in particular, the constancy atom is not safe for the unary 11 inclusion atom v 1 ⊆ v 2 , in which v 1 and v 2 must be single variables (rather than tuples of variables). 12 On the other hand, in [11] it was shown that strongly first order dependencies are safe for any family of downwards closed dependencies: It is also worth mentioning here that the same notions of safety and strong first orderness can be easily generalized to operators. For example, in [12] it was shown that the possibility operator
is safe for any collection of dependencies D, in the sense that every sentence of FO(D, ⋄) is equivalent to some sentence of FO(D). In the next section, we will instead see an example of an operator that is safe for any strongly first order collection of dependencies, but that is not safe for some other (non strongly first order, albeit still first order) dependency families.
On the Safety (and Unsafety) of Boolean Disjunction
A connective often added to the language of Team Semantics is the Boolean disjunction
11 This is a binary first order dependency, defined by the sentence D(R) = ∀xy(Rxy → ∃zRzx). The term "unary" is used here because each "side" of the dependency may have only one variable. 12 As a quick aside, similar phenomena occur in the study of the theory of second-order generalized quantifiers [22] . This suggests the existence of interesting -and, so far, largely unexplored -connections between the theory of second order generalized quantifiers and that of generalized dependency atoms. This is a different connective than the disjunction ∨ of Definition 5: for example, a team X of the form {(v : 0, w : 0), (v : 0, w : 1)} does not satisfy
It is well known in the literature that, as long as the Empty Team Property holds in our language and the model contains at least two elements, this connective can be expressed in terms of constancy atoms as φ ⊔ ψ ≡ ∃pq(=(p)∧ =(q) ∧ ((p = q ∧ φ) ∨ (p = q ∧ ψ))),
where p and q are two new variables not occurring in φ or ψ. However, this is not enough to guarantee that this connective will not affect the expressive power of a language based on Team Semantics if added to it, because of two reasons: 1. The empty team property does not necessarily apply to all logics FO(D), and when it does not then the above definition is not necessarily correct; 2. As shown in [12] , the constancy atom itself is not safe for all families of dependencies. As we will now show, the following result nonetheless holds:
◮ Proposition 14 (Boolean Disjunction is Safe for Strongly First Order dependencies). Let D be any strongly first order family of dependencies, and let FO(D, ⊔) be the logic obtained by adding to FO(D) the ⊔ connective with the semantics given above. Then every sentence of FO(D, ⊔) is equivalent to some first order sentence.
Proof. Let φ be any sentence of FO(D, ⊔). Then apply iteratively the following, easily verified transformations
until we obtain an expression φ ′ , equivalent to φ, of the form ⊔ i ψ i , where each ψ i is a sentence of FO(D). But since D is strongly first order, every such ψ i is equivalent to some first order sentence θ i ; and, therefore, φ itself is equivalent to the first order sentence i θ i . ◭ Thus, whenever we have a family of strongly first order dependencies D we can freely add the Boolean disjunction connective ⊔ to our language without increasing its expressive power. This is a deceptively simple result: in particular, it is not immediately obvious whether ⊔ is similarly "safe" for families of dependencies D that are not strongly first order. In fact, this is not the case! Consider, indeed, the two (first order, but not strongly first order) dependencies TS-LO2: M |= X LO2(x, y, z) if and only if X(xy) describes a total linear order with endpoints over M and X(z) does not contain the first element of this order, contains the second and the last, and whenever it contains an element it does not contain its successor (in the linear order) but it contains its successor's successor. TS-LO3: M |= X LO3(x, y, z) if and only if X(xy) describes a total linear order with endpoints over M and X(z) does not contain the first or the second elements of this order, contains the third and the last, and whenever it contains an element it does not contain its successor (in the linear order) or its successor's successor but it contains its successor's successor's successor. Then the FO(LO2, LO3, ⊔) sentence (∃xyzLO2(x, y, z)) ⊔ (∃xyzLO3(x, y, z) ) is easily seen to hold in a model M if and only if |M | is a multiple of two or of three (or is infinite).
However, there is no formula φ of FO(LO2, LO3) that is true if and only if this property holds. Indeed, suppose that such a φ existed. Then the LO2 dependency cannot appear in it: indeed, φ must be true of a model with exactly three elements, and in such a model any occurrence of LO2 would be false of every team (including the empty team) and hence, by the rules of Team Semantics (Definition 5), would make φ itself false. Similarly, the LO3 dependency cannot occur in φ, because φ must be true in a model with exactly two elements.
Therefore φ must be first order; and a standard back-and-forth argument shows that there is no first order formula over the empty signature that is true in a model if and only if its size is divisible by two or by three (or is infinite).
In conclusion, even though we may add the ⊔ operator "for free" as long as we are only working with strongly first order dependencies, this is not necessarily the case if we are working with more expressive types of dependencies.
Non-Jumping, Relativizable Dependencies
In this section we will prove a restricted version of Conjecture 1 under two additional (and commonly true) conditions. The first condition that we will assume will be that the dependencies we are discussing are relativizable in the sense of the following definition: 13 ◮ Definition 15 (Relativized Dependencies, Relativizable dependencies). Let D be a family of dependencies, and let P be a unary predicate. Then the language FO(D (P ) ) adds to First Order Logic the relativized dependence atoms D (P ) y, and the corresponding semantics (for models whose signature contains P ) is given by
where P M is the interpretation of P in M. 14 A dependency D, or a family of dependencies D, is said to be relativizable if any sentence of FO(D (P ) ) (resp. FO(D (P ) )) is equivalent to some sentence of FO(D) (resp . FO(D) ).
Essentially all the dependencies studied in the context of Team Semantics thus far are relativizable. Most of them have even the stronger property of being universe independent in the sense of [23] : in other words, whether M |= X Dy or not depends only on the value of X(y) (and not on the domain M of M), from which relativizability follows trivially.
As was pointed out to the author by Fausto Barbero in a personal communication, a counting argument shows that there exist generalized dependencies that are not relativizable. A concrete example is the unary dependency I ∞ = {(M, P ) : M is infinite }. Of course this is not a first order dependency, and it is an unusual dependency in that whether M |= X I ∞ v or not does not depend on X(v) but only on M ; but it is nonetheless a perfectly legitimate generalized dependency, and it is not relativizable. Indeed, the class of models C = {(M, P ) : P is infinite} is defined by the FO(I
∞ v; however, the same class of models is not defined by any FO(I ∞ ) sentence, because in any infinite model any occurrence of I ∞ can be replaced by the trivially true literal ⊤ and the class C is not first order definable. The author does not however know of any strongly first order generalized dependency that is not relativizable. The following conjecture is, therefore, open and -if true -would allow us to remove the relativizability requirement: ◮ Conjecture 2. Every strongly first order generalized dependency is relativizable.
In order to describe the second condition we need the following definition: In general, for D first order there is no guarantee that whenever (M, R) ∈ D there is some S ⊇ R at all such that (M, S) ∈ D max ; but, as we will see soon, if D is strongly first order this is indeed the case, and moreover D max itself is also strongly first order. 
In other words, a dependency D is non-jumping if whenever it holds of some R we can "enlarge" R to some R ′ that is maximal among those that satisfy D and such that, furthermore, any relation S between R and R ′ satisfies also D. It is easy to see that all dependencies discussed in this work thus far are non-jumping. It is possible to find examples of jumping dependencies, like for instance D = {(M, P ) : |P | = 1}; 15 but non-jumping dependencies clearly constitute a natural and general category of dependencies.
We now need to generalize the two following results from [11] to the case of dependencies that are not necessarily downwards closed: ◮ Proposition 18. Let D be a downwards closed strongly first order dependency. Then D max is also strongly first order, and whenever (M, R) ∈ D there is some
◮ Theorem 19. Let D be a downwards closed, strongly first order, relativizable dependency. 16 Then there are first order formulas θ 1 (x, z) . . . θ n (x, z) over the empty signature such that, for all models M = (M, R),
To do so, it suffices to observe the following: ◮ Proposition 20. Let D be a strongly first order, relativizable dependency. Then there exists a downwards closed strongly first order relativizable dependency F such that F max = D max .
Proof. The dependency Ex := ⊥ ⊔ (∀pq∃y((p = q ∨ y = x) ∧ Dy)) is strongly first order, because it is definable in terms of D and ⊔ and because of Proposition 14, and (M, R) ∈ E iff R = ∅ or there is some S ⊇ R such that (M, S) ∈ D. Thus E is also downwards closed, and it is relativizable since its relativization is E (P ) x := ⊥ ⊔ (∀pq∃y((p = q ∨ y = x) ∧ D (P ) y)) and D is relativizable and strongly first order. Now since D is strongly first order ∃vDv is equivalent to some first order sentence χ over the empty signature, and M |= χ iff there is some R such that ( 
For our next lemma, we need some model-theoretic machinery: The three following results can be found in [19] : → θ(x, a) ), ¬D(R)} is unsatisfiable. Indeed, suppose that it is satisfiable, and let B = (B, S, b) be a model that satisfies it. By Theorems 26 and 25, we can assume that B is ω-saturated. Now, since every formula positive in R that is true of (M, R, a) is also true of (B, S, b) and both are ω-saturated 18 x → θ(x, a) ) ∧ ¬D(T ′′ ); and furthermore, since h is a homomorphism, we have at once that T ⊆ T ′′ . Therefore, the model (A, T, a) can be expanded to a model (A, T, T ′′ , a) such that T ⊆ T ′′ , ∀x(T ′′ x → θ(x, a) ) and ¬D(T ′′ ). But (A, T, a) is elementarily equivalent to (M, R, a), which is ω-big. Therefore (M, R, a) can also be expanded to some (M, R, R ′′ , a) which is elementarily equivalent to (A, T, T ′′ , a) and in which thus R ′′ likewise contains R, contains only tuples m such that θ(m, a) (and, thus, is contained in R ′ ), and does not satisfy D(R ′′ ). This is however impossible, because we said that no such R ′′ exists; and therefore Ψ ∪ {∀x (Rx → θ(x, a) ), ¬D(R)} is indeed unsatisfiable.
By compactness, this implies that there exists a finite Ψ 0 ⊆ Ψ such that, for ψ + = Ψ 0 , 1. M, R, a |= ψ + (R, a) ∧ ∀x( Rx → θ(x, a) But then D(R) is also equivalent to ∃q 1 . . . q n pz 1 . . . z n ψ + 0 (R, q, p, z 1 . . . z n ) ∧ ∀x ((Rx → θ 0 (x, q, p, z 1 . . . z n )) for ψ + 0 = i =j q i = q j ∧ i p = q i ∧ i (p = q i → ψ + i (R, z i )) and θ 0 = i (p = q i → θ i (x, z i )), where p and all q i are tuples of distinct, new variables of length ⌈log 2 (n)⌉. ◭ ◮ Corollary 30. Every strongly first order, relativizable, non-jumping dependency is definable in terms of first order upwards closed dependencies and constancy atoms.
Proof. Let D be such a dependency. By the previous theorem, D(R) is equivalent to some expression of the form ∃z(ψ + (R, z) ∧ ∀x( Rx → θ(x, z) where |x| = k, |y| = l, and ψ + (∃zR_z/Rt) is obtained from ψ + (R, a) by replacing every a i with the corresponding y i and by replacing every occurrence Rt of R with ∃zRtz. E is upwards closed and first order, and thus strongly first order; and D is definable in FO(E, =(·)) as ∃z(=(z) ∧ Exz ∧ θ(x, z)), where z is a tuple of new variables disjoint from those of x. ◭
The above result provides a full characterization of strongly first order dependencies that are relativizable and non-jumping. I suspect that this result may be further generalized to jumping dependencies as a consequence of the following ◮ Conjecture 3. Every strongly first order dependency D(R) can be expressed as a disjunction i D i (R) of dependencies D i that are strongly first order and non-jumping. Furthermore, if Conjecture 2 holds, the requirement of relativizability may also be disposed of. This however, is left for future work.
Conclusions and Further Work
In this work I provided a full characterization of strongly first order dependencies in Team Semantics under the two (commonly true) additional assumptions that these dependencies are relativizable and non-jumping. The obvious next step consists in trying to find ways to remove or weaken these assumptions, for instance by proving Conjectures 2 and/or 3.
